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Abstract
In this basically expository paper we discuss the role of logic and math-
ematics in researches concerning the ontology of scientific theories, and we
consider the particular case of quantum mechanics. We argue that sys-
tems of logic in general, and classical logic in particular, may contribute
substantially with the ontology of any theory that has this logic in its
base. In the case of quantum mechanics, however, from the point of view
of philosophical discussions concerning identity and individuality, those
contributions may not be welcome for a specific interpretation, and an
alternative system of logic perhaps could be used instead of a classical
system. In this sense, we argue that the logic and ontology of a scientific
theory may be seen as mutually influencing each other. On the one hand,
logic contributes to shape the general features of the ontology of a the-
ory; on the other hand, the theory also puts constraints on the possible
understanding of ontology and, respectively, on possible systems of logic
that may be the underlying logic of the theory.
Keywords: logic; classical ontology; quantum ontology; quantum mechan-
ics; identity.
1 Introduction
In this expository paper we shall consider one foundational aspect of the philo-
sophical discussion of scientific theories. Our main purpose is to throw some
light in the role played by the underlying logic and mathematics of a theory in
the ontological counterpart of the scientific enterprise; we shall investigate how
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those usually unacknowledged parts of a scientific theory contribute to substan-
tiate an ontology associated with a theory.
By considering that today we have distinct and non-equivalent logical and
mathematical systems (for instance, different and non-equivalent set theories),
an immediate question poses itself: are we allowed to choose among some of
the available system(s) to ground our scientific credos or, alternatively, are we
necessarily committed to a certain (a priori and necessary) system of logic and
mathematics? Furthermore, how does the use of alternative underlying logics
influence in the possible ontologies of a theory? We shall defend a version of the
view that alternative systems of logic may be used profitably to formulate and
study the ontology of a theory. However, despite the plurality of those systems,
it is not the case that anything goes; as we mentioned, the theory itself puts
constraints on the possible ontologies that may reasonably be called upon for
the interpretation of a theory.
Our main contention in this paper is that there is a mutual influence be-
tween the logic and the ontology of a scientific theory. On the one hand, logic
encapsulates the most general categories of the theory and describes how these
categories work in general, providing for their principles. Thus, on one side logic
imposes from the bottom some restrictions on the possible ontologies allowed
for a theory; on the other side, scientific theories impose from the top constrains
on the objects to be dealt with, helping us also to shape the (supposed) most
adequate underlying logic (i.e. a logic ‘reflecting’ the general features of those
objects). This is a two way street, and we shall elaborate on its possible paths
and where they may lead to in the specific case of non-relativistic quantum
mechanics. Some hints involving quantum field theory are also mentioned en
passant, but just to exemplify some situation.
The overall plan of this paper is as follows. We begin by presenting in
the next section a general scheme that purports to describe in a rough way
the relation of a theory with reality. It shall be useful to help us make our
points on the relation of the underlying logic and a theory clearer. In section
3 we discuss what we call ‘classical ontology’ (a view grounded on classical
logic, which has intersections with both standard mathematics and classical
mechanics) and its relation to classical logic. In section 4 we discuss an ontology
inspired by quantum mechanics, termed ‘quantum ontology’ and analyze how
it may contribute to the suggestion that an alternative system of logic could
accommodate more profitably those features. We continue by discussing the
other side of the coin, namely, how (and if) logic might influence ontology by
imposing general features to objects, and conclude by reinforcing the claim that
logic is sensitive to the demands of empirical theories, so that it needs not to
be totally a priori.
2 A general scheme
We start by presenting in this section a general scheme that may be useful
for the philosophical study of ontological aspects of scientific theories. We are
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not claiming neither that this is the sole possible scheme nor that all scientific
theories should be understood according to it. Its main purpose is to help
us to illustrate in an idealized way the different steps in the elaboration of a
scientific theory and how ontological discussions may benefit from a closer look
to foundations in philosophy of science. Important to note that we are not
claiming that scientists make use of schema like this one, for apparently there
are no rules for the elaboration of a theory. Our scheme serves merely to the
purpose of enlightening some steps which are usually subsumed in the activities
proper of science. Let us consider the following sequence of steps:
R⇒ ER⇒ IT ⇒ T ⇒ A (1)
Some explanations are in order. We may may assume a form of metaphysi-
cal realism according to which something exists independently of us, even if it
cannot be described in full even by our best theories (put up to now). Let us
use the letter R for such a ‘reality’, although it could perhaps remain forever
‘veiled’ to us [7, Chap.9]. Of course we could adopt a different strategy and
suppose that there is no such a reality but just our phenomenological insights,
which we call ‘Empirical Reality’, or ‘Phenomenological Sense-Experience Re-
ality’, ER for short. Thus, in a non-realistic view, we could assume that we
should start with ER, so ignoring R; our scheme can also be understood this
way, so it is neutral as to the existence and possibility of theoretical knowledge
of an independent reality, for it is also coherent with the view that there is
nothing behind the appearances. Obviously, we here acknowledge that reality,
as it is, is partially inaccessible to our sense experience.1 All we get from (a
supposed existing) R is sense-data, derived from experiences, sensations, reflec-
tion, intuitions, learning, insights, whatever you will. In this sense, it is allowed
that different experiences, cultural background, biological (animal) skills, etc.,
may interfere in the way we further elaborate our sense-experiences. It is from
this ER that we elaborate our conceptual schemæthat gives us our scientific
theories, usually in an informal way to start with, that is, by presenting a non
axiomatized or formalized account of at least a parcel of ER.2
Another remark concerning R is in order. One could suppose that we are
referring to R in Husserl’s terms, as das Reale, a term which refers to the spatio-
temporal world as conceived by physics (see [13, p.23, fn.1]). But, as we shall
see below, we can say that there is not just one ontology conceived by physics,
for the domains of application may appear different depending on the physical
theory we are considering and, furthermore, depending on the part of the world
we are investigating, different theories seem to be required, since there is not
yet a unified general schema that applies to all scales.3 Here, R stands for a
1We say, following P. Kosso, “at least partially” inaccessible. Kosso defends what he calls
“realistic realism”, acknowledging that (according to realists) we can know something about
the world, but not everything can be known. See his [14], specially chapter 8.
2But of course nothing prevents that an axiomatized theory may be proposed from the
start. We are speaking about the most general and more common way of doing science. Here,
‘informal’ means ‘non axiomatized’.
3In fact, there are different physical theories on the market, and no unification is seen up
3
reality that is independent of us. The world, as conceived by physics, enters in
our IT s, which concentrate our ‘representations’, and their format depend on
the way we formulate our theories.
The sense-data collected in ER are elaborated in terms of more abstract
concepts. The scientific activity is a conceptual activity, and we use our skills
to link them in order to get a coherent whole which will serve to provide us
the way for making explanations, predictions and retrodictions, providing our
understanding of a situation. Thus we may speak of a theory. But, since we
wish to use the word ‘theory’ tout court to mean an axiomatized or a formal-
ized axiomatization of a field of knowledge, we prefer to call what we have
achieved an informal theory, IT for short. An IT can be viewed as a ‘mod-
eling’ concepts we have in form of an articulated framework that enables us
to get other results (supposedly) concerning a certain parcel of reality we are
interested in. Of course there are (in principle) infinitely many possibilities for
developing an IT , depending on the scientist’s preferences and on other fac-
tors. Furthermore, nothing excludes that a scientist presents ‘directly’ a theory
properly speaking, that is, an axiomatized or a formalized theory of the domain
under investigation (the distinction between axiomatization and formalization
shall be explained soon). Aristotle’s physics (see [27]), Galileo’s mechanics [10],
Darwin’s evolution theory [?], Dewey’s educational theory [6], Heisenberg’s ma-
trix mechanics, Schrödinger’s wave mechanics, Einstein’s general relativity, are
typical examples of IT s (see [23]).
Thus, the Informal Theories (IT s) we find in the standard literature are
usually theoretical (mathematical) elaborations that may be achieved in various
distinct ways. Just remember that Heisenberg and Schrödinger have advanced
alternative informal theories to the same subject, just as there are different evo-
lution theories that can be found in the literature (Wallace, Darwin, Lamarck,
etc.). Similarly, we should acknowledge that classical mechanics has different
formulations, such as those of Newton, Lagrange, Hamilton, and Hamilton-
Jacobi, at least. When constructing such a scientific theory, mainly in the
field of physics, we make use of mathematical concepts such as derivatives, dif-
ferential equations, statistics, and abstract spaces of several kinds. Even in
biology we can suppose that some mathematics is used, say in techniques taken
from statistics, combinatorial analysis, lattice theory, and so on. In economy,
presently much of differential and integral calculus has been used in some con-
texts and, generalizing, we can extend this hypothesis to scientific IT -theories
in general.
In general, IT s are what scientists aim at, and to most of their purposes
they are enough. But the philosopher and those occupied with foundations
may go further, looking for the logical structure of the achieved IT . Here a
meta-level discussion takes place, for we are no longer discussing the applica-
bility of the scientific constructs to reality, but we are rather looking to the
constructs themselves. This becomes clear when we try to go from the infor-
mal theories IT to their axiomatic versions, which we call theories (tout court).
to now.
4
But, why to axiomatize? It is well known that the rise of the movement called
the Arithmetization of Analysis started in the XIXth century from the dissat-
isfaction of mathematicians with the basic informal concepts they used, such
as those of function and real number, which were not rigorous as required for
foundational purposes. In physics, Newton’s mechanics generalizes more or less
axiomatically the informal developments advanced by Galileo, Kepler and oth-
ers. Maxwell’s electromagnetic theory, with some parsimony, can be seen as an
axiomatic framework, once we consider the possibility of presenting an adequate
language and taking his famous equations in the place of axioms. In the XXth
century, much was done in the axiomatizations in biology and in other areas
as well (see [22], [31]). By the way, this is the core of Hilbert’s 6th problem of
his Mathematical Problems, posed in 1900 (see [1]). With the rise of abstract
mathematical structures by the end of the XIXth century, and with the parallel
development of logic, axiomatization was seen as the method par excellence of
mathematical theories, and the XXth century has shown that it can be useful
for other areas as well.
What results from axiomatization? Here axiomatization can be taken in
Hilbert’s sense, either as a material axiomatization or as a formal axiomatiza-
tion. Material axiomatics (by hypothesis) do not lose the intuitive and intended
meaning of the informal theory. Peano’s (first-order) Arithmetics is supposed
to deal with arithmetics, with the natural numbers we have from our intu-
itive mathematics (the existence of non-standard models will be recalled soon).
Indeed, we are axiomatizing a certain informal theory and believing that the
axiomatic version fits the previous (informal) framework. For instance, there are
several axiomatizations of the theory of evolution, and all of them were proposed
to axiomatize evolution as firstly understood by Wallace and Darwin, although
there are also axiomatizations of more recent accounts, say incorporating genet-
ics (see [19] and the references therein; in [22] there is a wider discussion on the
axiomatization of biology).
To be more precise, let us assume, as Suppes has famously proposed,4 that
to axiomatize a theory (an informal theory) is to present a predicate in the
language of set theory [31]. (Here we are being a little more rigorous — a dis-
cussion about Suppes’ method and what was later called ‘Suppes predicates’ can
be found in [16], [15]). In presenting such a predicate, we are evolving from an
informal theory to an axiomatized version, which then becomes abstract, gain-
ing a certain autonomy from its first intended domain of application. Speaking
in terms of Suppes’ predicates, a predicate may have infinitely many mathemat-
ical structures as models, namely, the structures satisfying the predicate. For
instance, a predicate (set of axioms) for first-order Peano’s arithmetics will have
not only the standard model as a model, but many other non-standard models
4Of course this procedure cannot be applied in general without due qualification; for in-
stance, it doesn’t not serve to intuitionistic mathematics. Furthermore, if we strictly follow
Suppes, we become committed with classical logic and can consider only scientific theories
based on such a logic. The reader may note that we are here just exemplifying that in axiom-




A simple example illustrates the idea. Assuming classical logic and a stan-
dard set theory, think of a semi-group, which is an ordered pair composed of
a non-empty set S and a binary operation ? on S that is associative. The
predicate may be written in a simplified way (in the language of set theory) as
follows:
P(X)⇔ ∃S∃ ? (X = 〈S, ?〉 ∧ S 6= ∅ ∧ ? ∈ P(S × S × S)∧
∀x, y, z ∈ S(x ? (y ? z) = (x ? y) ? z)) (2)
This predicate has infinitely many structures X = 〈S, ?〉 as models, as is
well known (for instance, the set of real numbers endowed with addition, the
set of 2 × 2 matrices endowed with the addition of matrices, the set of contin-
uous real functions endowed with the composition of functions, etc.). This is
a quite trivial case, but for most theories of empirical sciences, the structures
are sets in a set theory like the Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) system (perhaps encom-
passing the Axiom of Choice, ZFC). The theories T of our scheme (1) can also
be presented in different ways, depending on the language, primitive concepts,
axioms, etc. we have employed. But, fixing a particular T , its models are the
abstract models of our scheme (the ‘A’ part of it), in the sense that a structure
X = 〈S, ?〉 obeying the above predicate is a semi-group. Thus, we see that
the construction of a theory, so as the consideration of its models, depend on
a meta-theory where the construction is performed, for we need to consider its
tools in order to define the relevant structures. For instance, standard quantum
mechanics needs unbounded operators. But in the so called Solovay set theo-
retical model, all operators are bounded [20]; so, how to construct a quantum
mechanics within such a set theory? Suppes did not consider this point, for he
works within an informal set theory in the corresponding mathematics which
turns out to be ZFC. But for a deeper philosophical consideration, it is clear
that we cannot leave this point behind. And this will happen mainly when we
consider the possibility of alternative systems of logic and set theories in which
these predicates may be developed.
The final stage in our schema consists in the abstract models A. Here, ideally
we have an axiomatized theory, with explicit underlying logic and axioms. It is
at this step that the relation with ontology, as we intend to discuss it, becomes
clearer. A system of logic indirectly involves substantial commitments that, once
the logic is assumed, are introduced in any scientific theory that is grounded in
such a logic (see for instance [4], [5]). Notice that the underlying logic involves
several fundamental assumptions that may influence a theory: for instance if
some version of the usual logical laws hold (excluded middle, non-contradiction,
the law of identity), so as the question whether the logic is strong enough to
ground the mathematics required for the theory, or how many truth values are
allowed in the system, and so on. Obviously, all of those are relevant factors for
the foundational counterpart of the theory. For instance, some systems of logic
are just too weak to be the underlying system of part of classical mathematics,
so they are ruled out as non-starters.
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Here we shall not turn to the full discussion these issues require, but once we
have arrived on the distinctions among the different stages of the elaboration
of a scientific theory, we wish to consider the mutual influence between logic
and ontology. We begin with what we call ‘classical ontology’. This was formed
from our informal view about the objects of our surroundings; the standard
assumptions we make about them, in a certain sense, have shaped classical logic,
standard mathematics and even classical mechanics. So, we arrive to an in re
approach to scientific theories: we suppose to have some ‘reality’ to start with,
and elaborate our scientific claims with the aim of obtaining knowledge about
this reality. But, in doing that, we create something new, a ‘theory’ which gains
a kind of autonomy and can be applied to other domains as well. Furthermore,
the developments given inside the theory may suggest that the world might
not be as expected, presenting some new and unsuspected details not perceived
before. Physics is perhaps the best space for examples, for instance of those
particles whose existence was proven ‘mathematically’ and only after this they
were ‘discovered’ to exists (for instance, the celebrated case of the omega-minus
particle − the reader may take a look at the October 1964 issue of Scientific
American).
So, there is a twofold way: we may start with the ‘reality’ (either R or
ER in our scheme), that is, by a certain ontological view, and look for the
corresponding theories aiming at describing it, or we can assume a certain IT or
T as already given in some way that look behind for the ontology (or ontologies)
that can be compatible with such theories. This interplay of course has logical
and ontological interests. But instead of discussing in in abstracto, let us sketch
a view we term ‘classical ontology’.
3 ‘Classical ontology’
In order to be applied to the real world, classical mechanics, as a mathemat-
ical theory, usually makes many idealizations and abstractions. For instance,
in Newtonian mechanics we assume that the planets orbit the sun in elliptical
orbits, but this is an idealization which could be true only if there were just
two bodies. On what concerns logic, it is usually assumed that standard ob-
jects of our surroundings obey the laws of classical logic (at least with a good
approximation): every object is identical to itself (numerical identity), for any
object o and any property P , the law of excluded middle holds, so that the
object either has the property (Po) or does not have it (it is not the case that
Po), and no object can both have and not have the same property in the same
circumstances (law of non-contradiction). Similar remarks could be made for
other laws of classical logic.
Classical logic, standard mathematics and, in a certain sense, classical me-
chanics, are grounded on our experiences with standard medium sized objects.
We call the result of this particular way to categorize the world ‘classical ontol-
ogy’. Of course, assuming that the world fits this description is a non-empirical
hypothesis. Furthermore, the claim should not be assumed as encompassing the
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supposition that it is a closed ‘world view’; there is plenty of space for discussion
on fine details about how to articulate the view, but the general outlines are
given by the constraints imposed by those theories.
To illustrate this last claim, consider the specific case of classical logic. Can
we simply search for the kind of world we would have from the point of view of
logic? Of course we can; so, by assuming classical logic, what are we committed
with? We need to take care in this point; a straightforward answer is not
available. It would not be wrong to assume that once classical logic or classical
mechanics (supposed grounded on such a logic) is assumed to apply to a certain
domain, the objects of this domain necessarily are already settled in their main
features, however, it is not the case that they are settled in their finer details.
In fact, classical logic has also a constructive interpretation (say in terms of
Paul Lorenzen’s approach [17]); thus, even when seen from the perspective of
classical logic, the domain might be ‘constructive’ in some sense. So, from the
point of view of logic (or mechanics) alone, we cannot decide, roughly speaking,
whether the world is somehow ‘constructive or not. Anyway, as we mentioned,
some of general guidelines are present.
Given the combination of classical logic, classical mathematics, and classical
mechanics, we may try to schematize a way of thinking by presenting some
characteristics of what we call O(C), for ‘classical ontology’, partially inspired
by Peter Mittelstaedt ([21]), part by Redhead and Teller ([26]), and part by our
own considerations. O(C), which we can say maps part of the presuppositions
assumed even implicitly in the formation of classical logic, may be roughly
described as encompassing at least the following features:
(1) Physical objects, according to this view, are continuants, in the sense that a
physical object at one time can (at least in principle) be re-identified as the same
one that exists at an earlier (and at a later) time, that is, they have genidentity.
Of course this feature also presupposes a lot more: O(C) is partially grounded
on what we call Newtonian’s absolute concept of space and time and on a form
of determinism, typical of classical physics. Re-identification, for all purposes,
may always be effected by following an in principle complete deterministic tra-
jectory, which every object is endowed with (with the proviso that there are no
collisions). But of course we might also enable the consideration of relativistic
mechanics, whose space-time is not Newtonian. Even so this characteristic of
objects do not change: it is a presupposition that they continue to be themselves
after modifications of their physical states.
(2) Physical objects are objects of predication; that is, they bear properties,
such as position, velocity, and energy. More than that, they obey what may
be called a Complete Determination Principle: we can (in principle) ascribe
simultaneous values to any set of physical properties for a given object.
This point makes a link of O(C) with some of the most well-known laws of
classical logic. Indeed, this conception of objects is grounded on the idea that
objects always either have or fail to have a given property, that is, once there
are characteristics that can be attributed to them, they either instantiate those
8
features or do not instantiate those features, and no third possibility is available
(a version of the law of the excluded middle). Another basic presupposition
is that an object cannot both have and not have a certain property at the
same time (and this commits us with the validity of a version of the law of
non-contradiction).
(3) Physical objects are individuals, in the sense that they obey some principle
of individuality; that is, we may assume that there is ‘something’ which confers
them individuality. This means that a certain object is distinct from any other
object. Saying in other words, in a way that will serve to us us later, given two
objects whatever, they are different and, being two, there is at least one ‘feature’,
in general a property, that distinguishes them. The search for a Principle of
Individuation has a long history in Western philosophy. The two most well-
known schools are those centered either in endorsing a form of substratum theory
or that there is nothing beyond the properties of the individuals, termed bundle
theories [18, Chap.3]. Both present problems on what concerns physics (for an
account involving quantum mechanics, see [9]). We shall come back to this point
soon.
In classical particle mechanics, where there are no deformations, every object
has a ‘history’ ascribed to it by the laws of motion. We can (in principle) trace
the trajectory of the object and follow it in time both forwards and backwards.
As Schrödinger has said a long time ago,
“[f]rom our experiences on a large scale, from our notion of geometry
and mechanics —particularly the mechanics of the celestial bodies—
physicists had distilled the one clear-cut demand that a truly clear
and complete description of any physical happening has to fulfill: it
ought to inform you precisely of what happens at any point in space
at any moment of time . . .We may call this demand the postulate of
continuity of description.” [29, p.26]
The problem in saying things like that without restriction is that it is trouble-
some when it comes to chaotic systems. Classical systems may be chaotic, and
in this case there will be no way to preview the final trajectory of a certain sys-
tem. But anyway, even in continuum mechanics (with deformations caused by
forces) we may assume that the trajectory does exist and that our ignorance is
confined to the epistemological level, and does not infect ontology. In this sense,
there is always, at least in principle, the possibility to attribute an individuating
feature to any object: its trajectory.
(4) The objects in O(C) may be physically indiscernible. Thus, to keep O(C)
intact (that is, to keep the objects’ individuality), we may need to assume, as
usual, that there exists something more in an object than the sum of its prop-
erties. Heinz Post said that such entities present a transcendental individuality
[24]. This view, obviously, is an alternative to the individuation by the trajec-
tory, commented on above. For instance, consider the situation below, where we
have N physically indiscernible objects to be accommodated into P containers.
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The number of possibilities can be determined; for instance, suppose N = 3 and
P = 2, and let us illustrate the situation with a rough schema; call the contain-
ers A and B and the systems a, b, c. Thus, we have the possibilities presented










To other cases, we can calculate the possibilities by a formula (which will not
concern us here — but see [11, cap.5]). This kind of counting is called Maxwell-
Boltzmann ‘statistics’. Important to remark that states 3, 4 and 5 (so as 6,7,8)
are taken as distinct because the objects are considered as individuals, as the
objects of O(C) are.
(5) ‘Classical objects’ may even be supposed to be in principle discernible from
each other. Any impossibility of distinguishing them then is regarded as an
epistemological ignorance only. This enables us to postulate that in having a
collection of them, we can regard it as a set in some standard set theory (a
collection of distinct objects, according to Cantor’s well known ‘definition’ [3,
p.85]). And, having a finite number of objects in O(C), we can attribute a
cardinal number to the collection. In this sense, this hypothesis says that there
cannot be solo numero indiscernible objects. So, if our ontology will admit
this possibility (as we shall suggest below), then standard set theories can be
questioned in expressing them (we beg your patience for now). This does not
prevent that indiscernible objects may be treated in such a framework, but
this will require some mathematical tricks in order to cope with indiscernibility,
a price we must pay if we intend to keep classical logic intact. The easiest
way to do that is to follow Hermann Weyl’s strategy of assuming a set S (say,
with cardinality n) and an equivalence relation ∼ defined over S. Thus, the
equivalence classes of the elements of S by the relation ∼ play the role of classes
of indiscernible objects [32, App.B]. But in doing that we have forgotten that
the objects were taken from the beginning as discernible elements of the set,
so something seems to be wrong with the formalism that intends to capture
indiscernibility (for a discussion, see [9]). We shall return to this point below.
4 A possible ontology for quantum mechanics
As we have said before, physical theories do not determine a priori and uni-
vocally their ontologies. The issue gets even more complicated when we notice
10
that even if a physical theory has an intended interpretation, in general it can
be later applied to other domains, dealing with very different kinds of things
(consider applications of the mathematical apparatus of quantum mechanics to
economy). Particular theories may have a specific behavior, but in the general
setting, the possibility of alternative interpretations are not ruled out a priori.
As is well-known, the formalism of non-relativistic quantum mechanics (we leave
quantum field theories out of this discussion) is compatible with a plurality of
incompatible ontologies.
Now, to narrow the field and advance in the search for one specific ontology,
let us first describe, in analogy with what we have exposed before, a minimum
nucleus of a possible ‘quantum ontology’. We shall term it O(Q), and we beg
the reader to understand that we are not claiming that this ontology is the only
one compatible with quantum mechanics. We are just describing what could be,
roughly, an ontology for quantum mechanics in which identity and individuality
are placed at the center of the concerns.
(1) In the ‘classical’ setting (compatible with O(C)), it is assumed that all
objects can be re-identified through time. There is an old problem concern-
ing what makes this re-identification possible, but it is a standard assumption
(we could say that it is a postulate) that they can be re-identified. Quantum
objects, in most interpretations, and here also in our O(Q), lack this character-
istics in certain situations as when their wave functions overlap. Thus, we are
endorsing the failure of Schrödinger’s above mentioned principle of continuity
of description (see page 9); as he has put it, “[i]t is this postulate of continuity
that appears [in quantum mechanics] to be unfulfillable!” (loc.cit.). For the
sake of completeness of the description, of course we should consider Bohm’s
quantum mechanics, which postulates that the objects’ trajectories never over-
lap. As we mentioned, there is not a single way to sort out the main features of
quantum objects, but we shall leave Bohmian theory aside for now, given that
it introduces further intricacies and falls on the “hidden variables” approach.
(2) By ‘to have identity’ we may understand the following: the object has some-
thing (the nature of this ‘something’ given either by substratum theories or by
bundle theories of individuation) that makes it an individual. Let us remark
that even though objects in O(C) may be taken as indiscernible from other
ones in some situations, as we have said before, this indiscernibility does not
pose a threat to their individuality, for they may be individuated by some tran-
scendental identity or even by their trajectories. Now, the situation is different
in quantum mechanics. The objects of O(Q) (in some situations) cannot be
discerned from similar ones, and there is no reason to suppose that they are
individuated by transcendental individuality.
In order to see this point from another perspective, suppose we have two quan-
tum objects, say two electrons, one here and another in Mars. They can be
described by distinct wave-functions ψ1 and ψ2 and hence they can be identi-
fied as Paul and Peter. But the problem appears when we try to describe the
joint system, for then we need to use an anti-symmetric wave-function (in the
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case of electrons), and in this case we shall have a linear combination of the
two wave-functions without being able to tell who is Peter and who is Paul.
We are able to go as far as to know that we have two entities, one here and
another there, but cannot say which is which, there is no need to introduce
a transcendental principle of individuality. This is a typical characteristic of
quantum objects according to the standards, and is assumed in O(Q).
Suppose we have a neutral Helium atom. As it is known, it has two electrons in
a superposed anti-symmetric state. It is possible to ionize the atom by releasing
one of the two electrons, getting a negative ion. It is clear that in this process
one electron was released. Now we can obtain a neutral atom again by making
the ion to absorb an electron. A chemical fact is that the ‘new’ neutral atom
will have all the same properties (values of any observable) of the ‘old’ one.
Everything that can be inferred from one of them can be inferred also from
the other as well. The question is: is the new neutral atom the same as the
the neutral atom ionized before? In the same vein, we can ask: is the released
electron the same as the absorbed electron? Apparently, these questions cannot
be answered non-arbitrarily.
From the physical or chemical points of view, this kind of question does not even
matter. As we have said, the results taken from the first atom and from the
second one are exactly the same, and that is all. Let us exemplify once more. In
the combustion of methane, CH4 + 2O2 → CO2 + 2H2O, one methane molecule
reacts with two Oxygen molecules to produce carbon dioxide and water vapor.
As we see, from the four Oxygen atoms present in the two Oxygen molecules,
two go to the dioxide, and two go to the water vapor. But, which ones? It does
not matter. Chemistry does not depend on this assumption. The individuality
of these objects is not something required to the theory. The only important
thing is the nature of the objects and the number of them.
Based non examples like this one, we assume that, according to O(Q), the
objects do not present identity conditions, in the sense that there is no a principle
of individuation that enables us to ascribe to one of them an identity that may
serve to re-identify it in a later situation, say by identifying which particular
Oxygen atoms are now forming the carbon dioxide.
(3) In classical physics, one of the basic assumptions is that given a certain
collection of properties of an object, all these properties can have definite values
simultaneously. This is called the Value Definiteness Problem. The difficulty
in effectively finding these values is of another nature, but it is an assumption
typical of O(C) that they exist and are well determined. In the quantum do-
main, there are restrictions to this principle. It is in fact one of the typical
characteristics of quantum mechanics that we cannot ascribe definite values to
all sets of observables at once. There are no-go theorems saying precisely that;
perhaps the most important one being the Kochen-Specker theorem (see [25]).
(4) Quantum objects may enter in states of superposition. This is perhaps the
great novelty of quantum physics. A particular case is that of entanglement,
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which Schödinger regarded as being the characteristic trait of quantum me-
chanics, and today quite important for new developments in physics, such as
quantum teleportation and quantum information (the interested reader will find
in [2] useful information). This is in particular the case of the two electrons of
the neutral Helium atom mentioned above. They are entangled. So, although
(in a given direction) they will present the values of their spin with opposite
values (say, 1/2 and −1/2), it is impossible to say which electron has which
particular value.
(5) Given the above, we cannot regard the objects of O(Q) as individuals in the
sense of O(C). Taking a terminology (perhaps a bad one) from the beginnings
of quantum mechanics, we say that the objects in O(Q) are non-individuals.
Heisenberg, Schödinger and others have said that, due to the fact that in quan-
tum physics objects like elementary particles could no more be identified, that
they had lost their individuality. According to O(Q), there is nothing to lose,
for they do not have individuality from the start. This is precisely the main ob-
jective of introducing O(Q): to pursue such an ontology right from the start (as
suggested by Heinz Post [24]). Important to say that this assumption does not
avoid that a quantum object may be isolated. This is done every day in physics.
But the important difference to the objects of O(C) is that the properties of a
certain isolated quantum object are exactly the same as of ‘another’ quantum
object of the same kind, whatever it is. And this in blatant distinction from
O(C).
(6) Another typical aspect of quantum objects concerns their behavior regarding
possible combinations. Let us suppose a situation such as that one described in
O(C) at page 13. Three quantum objects of the same kind are to be distributed
into two containers. Assume further that they are indiscernible bosons, so that
they share the same state (container). Then the possibilities are given by the
table below. There is also here a way of counting how many situations there
are (see [11, chap.5]). (The figure below is just an heuristic device; there is no
sense in representing quantum objects by little balls):5
A B
1 • • •
2 • • •
3 •• •
4 • ••
Now, we cannot even call a one of them; which one would be a? The objects
are now indiscernible in such a way that we cannot represent them as different,
even if the difference comes as attributed through a label. If they are fermions,
then they cannot share the same quantum state, and the only possibility would
be one of them in A and another one in B, but no distinction is possible if we
5Planck’s formula reads (N+P−1)!
N !(N−P )! , where N is the number of particles and P is the number
of possible states.
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permute one of them by the other that remained out. The first way of counting
(for bosons) is called Bose-Einstein ‘statistics’, and the later one the Fermi-Dirac
‘statistics’.
The reader may be thinking that we are strongly committed to the idea that
quantum objects can be viewed as little balls. We have emphasized that this
is not so. Thus, in order to show a typical situation in quantum field theory,
let us show you a figure taken from Wolfgang Ketterle’s Nobel Lecture [12].
The figure shows some situations involving quantum objects by relating their
wavelengths and the temperature. It is firstly shown that these quantities are
inverse one each other. Then, as the temperature T decreases, the wavelengths
become longer, until T becomes near the absolute zero (just few pico-Kelvins).
In this case, the waves become so long that all of them are seen as acting as if
they were just one big wave. Then we have a BEC, a Bose-Einstein Condensate,
and no distinction is possible: the bosons are in the same quantum state, and
so have all their characteristics shared among them.
Of course bosons need to be dealt with within QFT (quantum field theories),
but our discussion on quantum objects do not need to be restricted to non-
relativistic quantum mechanics. But QFT poses another difficulty we shall only
mention here. Most of them are local theories. This intuitively means that the
quantities that characterize a physical field are given at all points in space-time,
and the interaction of the fields is determined by their values at the coincident
points of space-time, that is, and this is referred to as they being local. The
problem is that this leads to the appearance of divergences which are physically
meaningless, that is, infinitely large values for some physical quantities. Then
nonlocal quantum field theories have been proposed to overcome this difficulty
with divergences. So, yet one could say that being local, the position in space-
time could serve as a principle of individuation, the same problem posed before
remains: due to the intrinsic characteristics of quantum objects (even in QFT),
any permutation leads to the same results. Non-individuality is present also
here.
5 Looking for a mathematical framework
According to the interpretation that gives rise to O(Q), quantum objects may
be indiscernible in a way that there is no physical means to discern them. But,
is there another option? Recall that classical objects, that is, those in O(C),
may also be indiscernible this way. But in this case they are discernible by
a principle encoded in O(C). The mathematical framework we use to express
O(C), namely standard set theory (of course this is just one of the options), as
we have seen, is compatible with the idea: collections of classical objects may
form sets, these objects obey classical logic, and every difficulty concerning their
possible distinguishability is regarded as an epistemological issue.
As we have suggested before, the same mathematical framework (encom-
passing classical logic), namely a standard set theory, can be used to ground
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Figure 1: Bose-Einstein Condensate, BEC. c©The Nobel Foundation.
the typical quantum formalism, but at the expense of some adjustments, such
as Weyl’s strategy. In other words, we can proceed by choosing a suitable con-
gruence relation to cope with indiscernibility. But, we know, at the bottom the
objects are assumed to be discernible; we are just pretending that they are not.
The usual procedure goes more or less as follows.
We start by labeling the objects as if they were distinguishable, say a and b
for the two electrons of an Helium atom to use once more our example mentioned
before. Then we demand that all physical measurable meaningful results must
be independent of this label attribution; for instance, in our example, we write
| ↑a〉 to say that object a has spin up in a given direction, and | ↓a〉 to say that
it has spin down in that direction. Thus, in order to say that one of them has




2)(| ↑a〉 · | ↓b〉 − | ↑b〉 · | ↓a〉)
the dots stand for the tensor product and 1/
√
2 is a normalization factor. An
exchange of labels leads to the vector −|ψ〉, but this does not matter; what is
relevant is |ψ|2, which gives us the probabilities, so the labels do not represent
nothing relevant here. So, no exchange of labels (which indicates a permutation
of particles) is physically detected. But we have detected it! And so mathemat-
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ics does! Some philosophers have claimed that we should use the Fock space
formalism instead, for in this case we would be free of the labels (see [26]). But
the trick remains due to the underling mathematics, which continues discerning
them (as pointed out in [9, chap.9]).
An ontology compatible with O(Q) should not use such tricks. Recalling
Post once more, the indiscernibility of the entities should be pursued right from
the start or, as suggested by John Stachel, “from bottom to top” [30].6 Then, in
order to cope with O(Q), we are in need of a different mathematical and logical
basis. We do not intend to present this mathematics here, but just mention
that it can be seen in [9], and with respect the way to express the quantum
formalism without presupposing labels, in [8].
6 Discussion
As we have argued, mathematical theories and set theory in general encompass
some of the assumptions of O(C) given that they help to shape O(C) itself.
However, those theories are powerful enough in order to develop quantum theory.
Now, to keep in touch with the consequences of such a theory in the ontological
side, at least, it seems one is advised to look for a more appropriate system
of logic, one that allows us to codify those features shown by quantum objects
as described above. So, in this sense, the theory influences from the top the
underlying logic, that is, there is a top-bottom influence. Once we come up
with such a logic and set theory, we are able to investigate how they influence
the theory from the bottom; perhaps, such a logic may enlighten some part of
the theory.
In the case of quantum mechanics, in particular concerning identity and
indiscernibility, one such system was indeed proposed: quasi-set theory (see
French and Krause [9]). Quasi-set theory encapsulates the idea that identity
and indiscernibility are distinct relations, and makes it explicit in the system.
Also, it does separate concepts of counting and cardinality. So, even if we begin
by using classical logic and mathematics to develop quantum theory, when it
comes to metaphysical discussion one can develop distinct systems of logic that
reflect more closely the features the relevant objects have.
By failing to notice the incompatibility, or by assuming that, for instance,
quantum objects may really be indiscernible, while at the same time keeping
classical logic, one is somehow re-introducing the very concepts the theory (un-
der the interpretation we proposed by describing O(Q), of course) seemed to
dismiss. In this sense, classical logic and mathematics in general may be seen
as introducing metaphysical assumptions through the backdoor.
In this sense, for those willing to keep classical logic and mathematics intact,
there is the alternative of adjusting other parts of the whole theory to accom-
modate the strange features of quantum mechanics. For instance, one must look
6Using his terminology, we can say that the loss of individuality made by suppositions like
Weyl’s strategy are “top down”, while the assumption of non-individuals from the start would
be “bottom up”.
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for explanations on quantum statistics and quantum indiscernibility that may
be compatible with quantum phenomena. In this sense, the ‘corrections’ are
made by re-interpreting phenomena at the top, on the theory itself, and leaving
the ‘bottom’, logic and mathematics, with no revisions. Both proposals are pos-
sible, but we have suggested that a revision of logic and set theory itself in the
light of quantum phenomena may be a welcome addition to our understanding
of those entities.
To contrast the proposal offered in this work, which sought to show how one
may end up revising the logic by judging from a particular ontological inter-
pretation of the results of the theory (QM), we may present briefly a proposal
advanced by Saunders (in [28]), comparing it with our proposal. According
to Saunders, roughly speaking, it is not clear which kind of objects quantum
mechanics deals with. In order to make that point clearer, one is advised to
keep classical logic as an auxiliary tool and just check whether there are means
to present formulas in a first-order regimented language of quantum mechan-
ics which could help us discern quantum objects. As is already well-known,
Saunders concluded that fermions may be weakly discerned, i.e., discerned by a
symmetric and irreflexive relation, while bosons are not even weakly discernible,
so that, at least in that work, they were simply not deemed to be objects by
Saunders’ lights. Of course, Saunders agrees that quantum entities are not dis-
cernible by properties; his claim is, however, that for fermions there is always
a relation discerning those entities. This move was meant to show that a ver-
sion of the Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) is valid in quantum
mechanics; while fermions do obey it, bosons are not a counterexample, their
failure to satisfy the principle means that they are not legitimate objects.
This approach has many interesting aspects we are ignoring here because of
the lack of space. Our main point is to call the reader’s attention to the fact
that first-order classical logic along with the PII plays the role of a ‘tailoring
tool’, so that together with the weak discernibility relations provided by quan-
tum mechanics one has a method for providing for the entities of the theory.
Furthermore, these entities are classical objects in the traditional sense (or so
Saunders claims).
Notice that there is a clear difference with our approach. We keep quantum
mechanical information about the nature of the objects and look for a more
adequately developed logic which encompasses the features of those objects.
The plan is to build in the logic itself those features which seem to be required
on the objects by the theory, at least according to a sensible interpretation
in which they are not individuals (sensible to our mind, anyway). Saunders’
strategy reverses the procedure: we keep logic intact and judge, with the help
of this very logic and a first-order version of PII, which among the posits of
quantum mechanics do satisfy the classical Quinean requirement for an entity
to a legitimate object in such a logic: it must have identity conditions. By being
weakly discernible, it seems, fermions fit the request, bosons do not, and are
accounted for in terms of modes of a quantum field.
We believe that Saunders’ proposal, ingenious as it is, falls prey to the prob-
lem we have already mentioned: inside the classical mathematical framework,
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there is always means to distinguish things, the mathematics is just too strong.
As we have argued, there are no indiscernible objects. In fact, more than that
is true, inside classical set theory one may always distinguish objects by a prop-
erty, not merely by a weakly discerning relation, as Saunders requires. In this
sense, an absolute kind of discernibility enters through the backdoor by the
adoption of classical mathematics. We believe that our approach is not prey to
such objections, given that it was made to account precisely for those features
of quantum particles.
It seems to us that logic need not be kept sacrosanct in the discussion of
ontology. As we have mentioned, Saunders’ position is interesting and legit-
imate, but we feel it presents some problems. By adjusting the logic also to
account for the entities a theory deals with one brings logic itself to the center
of the dispute, allowing for a more interesting investigation in search for a kind
of reflexive equilibrium between the demands of logic and the demands of a
specific theory. This would do more justice to the idea that science as a whole
is involved in the investigation of the nature of reality: that includes logic itself.
So, in this sense, logic is not immune to revision, and we include it seriously
among those of our tools used for the investigation of reality (but this is an issue
we have no space to discuss here).
Of course, we are aware that this kind of move proposed here does not solve
once and for all the problems associated with the ontology of quantum mechan-
ics. However, it gives us freedom to investigate how logic could be like were the
strictures of quantum mechanics to hold for every object. As it was shown in
[8], a completely coherent version of quantum mechanics may be erected on the
basis of this logico-ontological investigations. In this case, one may be sure that
indiscernibility is built-up from bottom up, making logic compatible with the
strictures of the theory. The road is open for us to investigate how this move
can shed some light on quantum mechanics and its ontology!
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